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Grounded cognition theory proposes that cognition, including meaning, is grounded in sen-
sorimotor processing.The mechanism for grounding cognition is mental simulation, which
is a type of mental imagery that re-enacts modal processing. To reveal top-down, corti-
cal mechanisms for mental simulation of shape, event-related potentials were recorded
to face and object pictures preceded by mental imagery. Mental imagery of the identi-
cal face or object picture (congruous condition) facilitated not only categorical perception
(VPP/N170) but also later visual knowledge [N3(00) complex] and linguistic knowledge
(N400) for faces more than objects, and strategic semantic analysis (late positive complex)
between 200 and 700 ms. The later effects resembled semantic congruity effects with
pictures. Mental imagery also facilitated category decisions, as a P3 peaked earlier for
congruous than incongruous (other category) pictures, resembling the case when identical
pictures repeat immediately. Thus mental imagery mimics semantic congruity and imme-
diate repetition priming processes with pictures. Perception control results showed the
opposite for faces and were in the same direction for objects: Perceptual repetition adapts
(and so impairs) processing of perceived faces from categorical perception onward, but
primes processing of objects during categorical perception, visual knowledge processes,
and strategic semantic analysis. For both imagery and perception, differences between
faces and objects support domain-specificity and indicate that cognition is grounded in
modal processing. Altogether, this direct neural evidence reveals that top-down processes
of mental imagery sustain an imagistic representation that mimics perception well enough
to prime subsequent perception and cognition. Findings also suggest that automatic men-
tal simulation of the visual shape of faces and objects operates between 200 and 400 ms,
and strategic mental simulation operates between 400 and 700 ms.
Keywords: mental imagery, visual shape perception, object categorization, face identification, semantic memory
priming, visual knowledge, embodiment and grounded cognition, event-related potential
INTRODUCTION
Mental imagery is the ability to reactivate and manipulate
modality-specific mental representations when current sensory
stimulation or overt motor action is absent, and this ability can
be associated with the subjective experience of perceiving or act-
ing within one’s mental world (e.g., “seeing with the mind’s eye”).
Mechanisms of mental imagery have been proposed in large scale
network theories (Kosslyn et al., 2006). At an abstract level, such
imagistic theories propose that, during mental imagery, modality-
specific, long-term memory is reactivated in a top-down manner
and maintained via working memory processes so that they can be
inspected and manipulated to achieve a task goal (Kosslyn, 1994;
Kosslyn et al., 2001; Ganis et al., 2003; Ganis and Schendan, 2011).
Notably, the mechanisms proposed in these theories of mental
imagery resemble those in grounded (embodied) cognition theory,
which proposes that cognition is grounded in modal processing of
sensorimotor information and introspective states (e.g., emotion,
motivation, intention; Pulvermuller, 1999; Barsalou, 2008). Like
imagistic theories of mental imagery, grounded cognition theory
challenges the dominant symbol systems paradigm inspired by
formal theories of logic, language, and computation that proposes
that amodal symbol representations, which are independent from
the sensorimotor processes, support language, thinking, atten-
tion, memory, and meaning (Fodor, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Pylyshyn, 2003). Recently, however, tests of grounded cognition
theory have yielded compelling evidence that modal processing
affects cognition, including meaning, even when task irrelevant,
and vice versa (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998; Wilson, 2002; Vigliocco
et al., 2006; Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Kemmerer
et al., 2008; Chatterjee, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011; Hirschfeld and
Zwitserlood, 2011; Meteyard et al., 2011). However, little is yet
known about when, how, and how much cognition is grounded
and about the brain mechanisms (Mahon and Caramazza, 2009;
Chatterjee, 2010; Rumiati et al., 2010; Meteyard et al., 2011). The
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main proposal for how cognition is grounded is mental simu-
lation, defined as the “re-enactment of perceptual, motor, and
introspective states acquired during experience with the world,
body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008, 2009). The present experiment
aims to reveal the cortical dynamics of mental imagery mecha-
nisms that may ground cognition in mental simulations. Crucially,
the cortical dynamics of mental imagery and mental simulations
that ground cognition are almost entirely unknown because elec-
tromagnetic brain sensing methods, which reveal neural activity
directly with the required high time precision [milliseconds (ms)],
have not been applied, as done here.
An important distinction in grounded cognition theory to
consider is that between non-conscious automatic simulations
implicated, for example, in constructing meaning from lan-
guage (Bub and Masson, 2010; Wassenburg and Zwaan, 2010)
and conscious effortful simulations, such as mental imagery,
that result from conscious representations constructed in work-
ing memory strategically (Kosslyn et al., 2006; Barsalou, 2008,
2009). Critically for the present study, both types of simula-
tion share common representations (Barsalou, 2008; Moulton
and Kosslyn, 2009). We hypothesize that, at the level of brain
mechanisms, the top-down feedback mechanisms that support
automatic simulation are a subset of those that support mental
imagery (and conscious effortful simulations; Ganis and Schen-
dan, 2011). Specifically, we propose that non-conscious automatic
simulations unfold via reflexive top-down signals from higher to
lower level areas along modal information processing pathways
(e.g., the ventral stream for processing visual objects): Perceiv-
ing a stimulus triggers these processes reflexively. These same
processes are triggered by effortful, strategic, task-oriented, top-
down signals from the prefrontal cortex during mental imagery
(Ganis and Kosslyn, 2007), which also triggers them most strongly
due to the deliberate, targeted nature of the task requirements.
Thus, studying mental imagery provides a powerful way to
reveal the maximum set of top-down feedback mechanisms that
support mental simulation, including non-conscious automatic
simulation.
To ensure that mental imagery mechanisms underlie the effects,
this experiment used a validated mental imagery task (Kosslyn
et al., 2006). The key task elements are that subjects first mem-
orize pictures of faces of real people or objects extensively and
then practice visualizing these pictures mentally. Afterward, dur-
ing the mental imagery task, the name of the person (or object)
cues mental visualization of the associated picture of the face (or
object). The critical and novel element of this design is that, after
subjects report (by pressing a key) that they have generated a
vivid mental image, a target picture appears 200 ms later. This
picture is either identical to the picture that they had learned to
visualize (congruous condition) or different from it, being from
the opposite category (i.e., if a face was visualized, an object
is shown, and vice versa: incongruous condition). The impact of
the imagined picture on the target picture is used to define the
cortical dynamics of mental imagery. The advantage to com-
paring mental imagery of these two categories is that faces and
objects recruit different posterior visual processing areas (Hasson
et al., 2003; Downing et al., 2006) and are associated with dis-
tinct ERP signatures (e.g., Schendan et al., 1998; Allison et al.,
1999; Puce et al., 1999). This experiment thus reveals when top-
down processes for mental imagery of visual shape can ground
cognition of faces and other objects. Such neurophysiological
markers will be crucial for future work on when, how, and how
much top-down cortical processes of mental simulation ground
cognition.
Findings from this experiment have been reported already
for early ERPs before 200 ms (Ganis and Schendan, 2008), that
is, the vertex positive potential and its occipitotemporal N170
counterpart (VPP/N170), which are associated with categorical
perception. The goal here was to analyze the later ERPs that were
not analyzed previously and are associated with knowledge, mean-
ing, and category decisions. These abilities are the main targets for
grounded cognition explanations. The main hypothesis is that, if
mental simulation constructs cognition, including meaning, then
mental simulation of modal processes induced by mental imagery
(and the associated cortical dynamics revealed by the ERPs) should
resemble those associated with cognitive and semantic effects.
If true, then this would constitute crucial evidence that links
mental simulation of modal processing (using top-down mental
imagery mechanisms) with cognition and meaning, as proposed in
grounded cognition theory. To assess cognitive effects, this study
capitalizes on ERP markers of face and object cognition (Neu-
mann and Schweinberger, 2008; Schendan and Maher, 2009). To
assess semantic effects, in particular, this study capitalizes also
on well-studied semantic congruity and priming effects. These
effects are thought to reflect processing meaning in the semantic
memory system (Rossell et al., 2003) and to operate via the same
automatic top-down processes implicated in automatic mental
simulation (Collins and Loftus, 1975; Franklin et al., 2007; Kutas
and Federmeier, 2011).
To predict the specific pattern of ERP cognitive, semantic con-
gruity, and priming effects that mental imagery could produce, this
report capitalizes on the two-state interactive (2-SI) account of the
brain basis of visual object cognition (Schendan and Kutas, 2003,
2007; Schendan and Maher, 2009) and extends it into a multi-state
interactive (MUSI) account. This framework proposes that pos-
terior object processing areas activate at multiple times in brain
“states” serving distinct functions. State 1: Initial activity in object
processing areas feeds forward from occipital to temporal cortex
between ∼120 and ∼200 ms when a visual object is coarsely per-
ceptually categorized, indexed by the VPP/N170 (Schendan et al.,
1998; Schendan and Lucia, 2009). State 2: Object processing areas
activate again but in a sustained, interactive manner dominated
by feedback and recurrent processing among these areas and ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) between ∼200 and 500 ms,
indexed by a frontal N3(00) complex (often labeled frontal N400).
The N3 is specific to processing pictures of a face or object and non-
linguistic information (e.g., shape; Barrett and Rugg, 1989, 1990;
McPherson and Holcomb, 1999; Nessler et al., 2005) and is the first
ERP to modulate according to visual cognitive factors that simi-
larly affect object processing areas and VLPFC, including semantic
memory (Barrett and Rugg, 1990; Zhang et al., 1995; Doniger
et al., 2000, 2001; Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2003, 2007; Phil-
iastides and Sajda, 2006, 2007; Philiastides et al., 2006; Schendan
and Lucia, 2009, 2010; Schendan and Maher, 2009). For exam-
ple, the N3 becomes more negative with greater mental rotation
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(Schendan and Lucia, 2009), worse speed and accuracy of category
decisions, greater stimulus atypicality and impoverishment (e.g.,
atypical views, visual degradation; Doniger et al., 2000; Schendan
and Kutas, 2002, 2003; Johnson and Olshausen, 2003), and implicit
memory (repetition priming, i.e., better decisions for repeated
than new objects; Henson et al., 2004; Schendan and Kutas, 2007)
primarily for meaningful objects (e.g., dog; Voss et al., 2010). Such
effects also localize to object processing areas (David et al., 2005,
2006; Philiastides and Sajda, 2006, 2007; Sehatpour et al., 2008;
Schendan and Maher, 2009; Schendan and Lucia, 2010; Clarke
et al., 2011). Later in state 2, the well-studied, centroparietal N400
between 300 and 500 ms reflects interactive activation of seman-
tic memory in anterior temporal cortex and VLPFC, especially in
response to words (i.e., linguistic stimuli; Marinkovic et al., 2003;
Lau et al., 2008; Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). Both mid-latency
negativities (N3 and N400) are more negative for stimuli that
are incongruous (i.e., non-matching) relative to congruous (i.e.,
matching) with the immediately preceding semantic context based
on a sentence or scene (Ganis et al., 1996). A similar account has
been proposed for face cognition (Neumann and Schweinberger,
2008; Burton et al., 2011).
The MUSI account revises this story by adding State 3 that
operates after about 400 to 500 ms and performs internal eval-
uation and verification processes, including conscious effortful
mental simulations. For example, later verification of category
decisions, more complex semantic processes, and episodic mem-
ory have been associated with a posterior late positive complex
(LPC) after ∼500 ms (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; Rugg and
Curran, 2007; Voss et al., 2010) that is, instead, more positive
to incongruous than congruous semantic contexts with objects,
videos, and faces (Ganis et al., 1996; Schendan and Kutas, 2002;
Ganis and Kutas, 2003; Sitnikova et al., 2009, 2010). Altogether,
this predicts that the N3 and N400 will be more negative and
the LPC will be more positive when mental imagery does not
match the current picture (incongruous) than when it does match
(congruous). Finally, cortical sources of the ERPs to faces and
objects and associated congruity effects should differ because
these two categories recruit distinct cortical areas (Hasson et al.,
2003).
Prior work on mental imagery and semantic congruity and
priming would not necessarily predict such later effects, how-
ever. The only prior ERP study with a similar mental imagery
task revealed no effects after 300 ms, predicting no effects here
(Farah et al., 1988), but that study involved imagery of two let-
ters, which have minimal meaning. In contrast, the present work
aims to reveal mental imagery for stimuli with richer seman-
tic content. Studies of semantic congruity and priming effects
would also predict no ERP effects of mental imagery after 200
or 300 ms because the slow stimulus timing and cross modal con-
ditions here (i.e., word cue followed by picture) violate standard
methods for producing such semantic effects, as detailed in the dis-
cussion. To anticipate, results reveal effects not only on the early
VPP/N170 during categorical perception, as reported previously
(Ganis and Schendan, 2008), but also later ERPs (N3, N400, and
LPC) linked to knowledge, meaning, and categorization, as well
as a P3(00) linked to immediate repetition priming of perceived
faces and objects (Bentin and McCarthy, 1994; Nielsen-Bohlman
and Knight, 1994). In addition, we report results of new analyses
of data from the perception control experiment conducted in the
same group of participants (Ganis and Schendan, 2008) that had
not been explored previously (i.e., face ERPs after 500 ms and all
object ERPs). As ERPs to faces starting from the early VPP/N170
until 500 ms show perceptual adaptation (i.e., reduced for con-
gruous; Ganis and Schendan, 2008), the N3, N400, and LPC ERPs
should likewise show adaptation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants, materials, design, procedures, and electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) recording methods for these mental imagery and
perception control experiments were detailed previously (Ganis
and Schendan, 2008). This section summarizes key aspects of
the methods for understanding this report. The mental imagery
experiment started with memorization of pictures of 11 faces
of real people and 11 common real objects across 13 exposures
each. Next, participants practiced mentally visualizing each mem-
orized picture three times. For this imagery practice, the name
appeared followed by a gray screen during which subjects visual-
ized the picture of the named face (object). Once they had done
so, they pressed a key to see the actual picture in order to adjust
their mental image. For the mental imagery test (Figure 1A),
the name appeared for 300 ms followed by a gray screen dur-
ing which subjects visualized mentally the associated memorized
picture. As soon as they had generated this mental image, they
pressed a key. Two-hundred milliseconds after the key press the
test picture appeared for 300 ms. The test picture was either the
picture of the face (object) that was visualized mentally or a pic-
ture from the other category [i.e., an object (a face)]. The two
by two design included within-subject factors of image congruity
(congruous, incongruous) by category type of target picture (face,
object). There were 55 trials for each of the four critical combi-
nations (image-picture target pairings) of congruous (face–face;
object–object) and incongruous (object-face; face object) condi-
tions. Stimuli were presented on a 21′′ cathode-ray tube monitor
(1,024× 768, 150 Hz refresh, Dell P1130) using custom-made
StimPres2.0 software for the Neurocog system that ensures pre-
cise stimulus time-locking to the EEG (Holcomb, 2003). EEG was
recorded at 250 Hz (bandpass .01–100 Hz) from 32 Ag/AgCl elec-
trodes attached to a plastic cap (Figure 1B) and electrodes attached
via adhesive to the nose, right and left mastoids, underneath the
right eye, and lateral to each eye. The perception control experi-
ment with the same subjects was identical, except for the following.
There were no memorization and imagery practice sessions, and
participants were shown a picture instead of a name before the test
picture: The two pictures were shown consecutively with a 200 ms
interstimulus interval (ISI), and the first picture was shown until
the participant pressed a key to report that they had identified the
object (or face). There were 66 trials in each of the four critical
conditions. The primary goal of the control experiment was to
replicate perceptual adaptation of the early VPP/N170, and so, in
order to focus on higher-level face (object) processing in poste-
rior category specific cortex, instead of low-level simple features,
the first and second pictures were never identical, even in face–
face and object–object (congruous) trials (Ganis and Schendan,
2008).
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FIGURE 1 | Methods. (A) Diagram of an experimental trial for the test of
mental imagery for faces and objects (only a congruous trial of face
imagery – face picture is shown). An appropriate face (or object, not shown)
was visualized mentally upon seeing the corresponding name (which was
on the screen for 300 ms). Subjects pressed a key as soon as they had
generated a vivid mental image, and 200 ms after this key press, the test
picture appeared, which was either the identical picture that had been
imaged mentally (congruous condition) or not (in which case the picture
was from the other category: incongruous condition). There was no task on
the test pictures. Perception trials (not shown) had a parallel structure to
imagery, except that the trial started with perception of a picture of a face
(object) was presented until subjects pressed a key as soon as they
identified it. (B) Thirty-two-channel geodesic montage for EEG recording.
Circles show each electrode location with its numerical label. Actual or
approximate (∼) locations of 10–10 sites are italicized and in red; posterior
sites 23, 24, and 32 lie 1 cm below the inion.
ERP ANALYSES
ERPs were calculated by averaging EEG to each condition, exclud-
ing trials with above threshold muscle activity, blinks, eye, and
other movement artifacts, time-locking to test picture onset
with a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline. For analyses, ERPs were
re-referenced to the mean of both mastoids, and, for visual com-
parison with prior work, also to the average of all electrodes,
except bilateral eyes. Maps of voltage distribution across the head
were produced using EEGLab software. Eighteen subjects were
analyzed; note, due to a scripting error, 1 of the original 19 subjects
was not analyzed, but performance results and visual inspection
of ERP patterns showed that all results remained the same with
and without this subject.
Data were submitted to analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with
within-subject factors of congruity and category type (type). For
ERPs, ANOVAs assessed separately the lateral pairs (1–26) and
midline sites (27–32). Lateral ANOVAs included within-subject
factors of Electrode (13 levels) and Hemisphere (left, right). Mid-
line ANOVAs included within-subject factors of Electrode (3 lev-
els) and Site [frontocentral (27–29), occipitoparietal (30–32)]. If
Mauchley’s test indicated violations of sphericity, the Greenhouse–
Geisser correction was applied to the p-value. For brevity, only
critical Congruity and Type effects are reported, as scalp location
effects alone are not of theoretical interest.
Mean ERP amplitudes were measured within time periods after
200 ms chosen based on prior studies. (1) As N3(00) complex
components can vary in functional modulation in ∼100 ms time
periods between 200 and 500 ms (Schendan and Maher, 2009),
analyses assessed separately (a) 200–299 ms (frontopolar P250 and
related polarity inverted occipitotemporal Ncl/N250; e.g., Doniger
et al., 2000; Federmeier and Kutas, 2002; Sehatpour et al., 2006;
Schendan and Lucia, 2010), (b) 300–399 ms (frontal N350; e.g.,
Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2003, 2007), and (c) 400–499 ms (fron-
topolar N450 and frontocentral N390; e.g., Barrett and Rugg, 1989;
Ganis and Kutas, 2003; Schendan and Maher, 2009). The latter two
times (300–500 ms) also included the N400 (Ganis et al., 1996). (2)
The LPC was assessed from 500 to 699 ms (Heil, 2002; Schendan
and Lucia, 2009). (3) Continuation of effects was assessed from
700 to 899 ms (Schendan and Maher, 2009).
To isolate effects, focal spatiotemporal analyses were run on sites
and times for which the face (object) cognition-, congruity-, or
priming-related ERP was maximal and overlapped least with oth-
ers; these location choices were confirmed and adjusted by visual
inspection. (1) From 200 to 299, 300 to 399, and 400 to 499 ms,
respectively, (a) pair 1-2 assessed the frontopolar P250, N350, and
N450, (b) pair 11-12 assessed the frontocentral N350 and N390,
(c) and pair 17-18 assessed their polarity inverted, occipitotempo-
ral counterparts (Scott et al., 2006; Schendan and Maher, 2009).
(2) These times (200–499 ms) were also assessed at pair 19-20 for
the centroparietal N400 (Ganis et al., 1996); note, 200–299 ms was
included as visual inspection suggested an N400 onset before its
typical 300 ms start. (3) Centroparietal pair 19-20 also assessed
the LPC from 500 to 699 ms. (4) Visual inspection indicated that
a P3 peaked earlier for congruous (∼375 ms) than incongruous
stimuli (∼500 ms). Consequently, early on, the congruity effect
is more positive for congruous than incongruous from 300 to
400 ms, and later, from 400 to 700 ms, the effect is in the opposite
direction. To capture this, local positive peak latency (i.e., highest
peak within±20 ms to avoid spurious peaks due to high frequency
noise) between 300 and 699 ms was assessed in each condition at
midline occipitoparietal site 30, based on the location of simi-
lar immediate repetition effects on the P3 (Bentin and McCarthy,
1994). P3 mean amplitude was also assessed from 300 to 399, 400
to 499, and 500 to 699 ms at site 30. (5) Since visual inspection
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suggested frontal effects continued after 500 ms, frontopolar and
frontocentral focal analyses were also run from 500 to 699 and
700 to 899 ms. For focal analyses, which are more precise (albeit
less comprehensive) than omnibus analyses, congruity by category
interactions were assessed further using planned simple effect tests
of congruity for each category condition.
For perception control ERPs, analyses were the same as for
imagery, except for the following. Face ERP analyses through
500 ms were already carried out and reported (Ganis and Schen-
dan, 2008) and so not duplicated here. ERPs for faces after 500 ms
and those for objects after 200 ms were analyzed separately, and,
for brevity in reporting these control data, comparisons between
faces and objects are reported only for focal spatiotemporal analy-
ses, and omnibus analyses are not reported, but they confirmed
the focal results.
SOURCE ESTIMATION
Source estimation methods evaluated whether distinct sources
underlie congruity effects between categories and category dif-
ferences. The inverse problem of localizing the cortical sources
of electromagnetic data recorded from the scalp has no unique
solution without additional constraints. Standardized low resolu-
tion brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) estimates the
sources (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) by making a maximum smooth-
ness assumption to compute the three-dimensional (3D) distri-
bution of current density using a standardized, discrete, 3D dis-
tributed, linear, minimum norm inverse solution. Localization is
data-driven, unbiased (even with noisy data), and exact but has low
spatial precision due to smoothing assumptions resulting in highly
correlated adjacent cortical volume units. A realistic head model
constrains the solution anatomically using the structure of corti-
cal gray matter from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
average of 152 human brains as determined using a probabilistic
Talairach atlas.
sLORETA software computed the sources of the grand aver-
age ERP difference waves using data from all sites, except nose
and eyes (Pascual-Marqui, 2002). ERP difference data are analo-
gous to the signal changes between fMRI conditions, and, thus,
limit the sources to those that could reflect fMRI differences, and
difference waves can reveal weaker sources better (Luck, 2005).
Data were analyzed with bandpass filter of 0.01–20 Hz, based
on the validated sLORETA analyses reported previously for the
VPP/N170 (Ganis and Schendan, 2008). Electrode coordinates
were digitized using an infrared digitization system, and imported
into LORETA-Key software. This coordinate file was converted
using sLORETA electrode coordinate conversion tools. The trans-
formation matrix was calculated with a regularization parameter
(smoothness) corresponding to the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio
estimated for each difference wave separately at each 100 ms time
period of interest from 200 to 900 ms relative to the 100 ms
baseline.
RESULTS
These results cover all times and comparisons not analyzed for
our prior report on this study, which focused mostly on face
ERPs before 200 ms during imagery and perception (Ganis and
Schendan, 2008).
MENTAL IMAGERY ERPs
Mental imagery results for faces during the first 500 ms and objects
during the first 200 ms were reported previously (Ganis and Schen-
dan, 2008). The new ERP results here reveal congruity effects
to faces after 500 ms (Figure 2), those to objects after 200 ms
(Figure 3), and category type effects (Figures 6 and 7) and inter-
actions of congruity by type after 200 ms (Figures 4–6). For
comparison with previous work, ERPs are also plotted with the
common average reference (Figures 8 and 9). For brevity, (a) only
congruity and category type effects, which are of theoretical inter-
est, are reported, (b) degrees of freedom (df) are listed only for the
first report of each effect, and (c) planned contrasts for omnibus
results are not reported, except to note that they supported the
corresponding focal spatiotemporal results. For the focal results
[all dfs (1, 13)], any interactions of congruity and category type
were followed with corresponding contrast ANOVAs that assessed
the congruity effects to objects and faces, separately.
200–500ms: N3, N400, AND P3
Negativity on the N3 was greater for incongruous than congru-
ous imagery, and the N400 showed this pattern only for faces
(Figures 2–4). Negativity was greater for objects than faces for
the N3, regardless of congruity, and the N400 showed this pattern
for congruous imagery but showed the opposite for incongruous
imagery (Figure 6), consistent with the N400 congruity effect for
faces but not objects. Congruity effects had a frontocentral max-
imum for faces (Figure 2B) and a frontopolar maximum instead
for objects (Figure 3B), and, accordingly, object and face categories
differed mainly frontally (Figure 7). All effects inverted polarity
over occipitotemporal sites. Accordingly,omnibus results (Table 1)
showed congruity and category type effects, and interactions of
congruity by category type from 200 to 400 ms in lateral and mid-
line ANOVAs and also from 400 to 500 ms in lateral ANOVAs, but
showed only category type and congruity by category type interac-
tions in midline ANOVAs from 400 to 500 ms when N3 congruity
effects to objects ended.
N3 complex
Focal spatiotemporal results (Table 2) confirmed frontopolar N3
congruity effects for objects, frontocentral N3 congruity effects
for both categories, and centroparietal N400 congruity effects
for faces, and occipitotemporal polarity inversion of congruity
effects for objects, as well as category type effects. Specifically,
results showed type effects on the entire N3 complex from 200 to
500 ms, as frontal negativity and occipitotemporal positivity were
greater for objects than faces (Figure 7). Congruity was signifi-
cant at frontopolar and frontocentral sites from 200 to 400 ms,
and, at occipitotemporal sites, congruity was marginal from 200
to 300 ms [F(1, 17)= 3.98, p= 0.062]; note, while occipitotempo-
ral congruity was also significant from 400 to 500 ms, this was due
to the start of the posterior LPC. Congruity interacted with type
from 200 to 300 ms at frontopolar sites and from 200 to 500 ms at
frontocentral sites (Figures 2 and 3). Planned simple effects tests
of the congruity effect for each type showed that this was because
congruity effects were largest for objects at frontopolar sites and
largest for faces at frontocentral sites and inverted polarity occipi-
totemporally for objects. Specifically, Table 2 shows congruity was
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FIGURE 2 | Mental imagery congruity effects for faces. (A) Grand average ERPs between −100 and 900 ms at all 32 channels shown filtered low-pass 30 Hz.
(B) Maps of voltage across the scalp for difference waves of the ERPs in (A). VPP, vertex positive potential; LPC, late positive complex.
significant at frontopolar sites for objects from 200 to 300 ms and
for both category types from 300 to 400 ms, and at frontocentral
sites for both from 200 to 400 ms and then later only for faces from
400 to 500 ms. At occipitotemporal sites, congruity was significant
only for objects from 200 to 300 ms during the N3 and later from
400 to 500 ms when LPC effects start.
These results and visual inspection indicated that, while fron-
topolar N3 congruity effects for objects ended by 400 ms, fronto-
central congruity effects to faces, as well as type effects at these sites,
continued after 500 ms. To assess this, focal analyses of these frontal
sites were run on later times. Results (Table 2) at frontopolar sites
confirmed no congruity effects there after 400 ms and type effects
ongoing between 200 and 900 ms. Frontocentral results confirmed
that type effects continued, and congruity effects remained larger
for faces than objects until 900 ms, and, indeed, were significant
only for faces from 400 to 900 ms. In sum, frontopolar and occip-
itotemporal object congruity effects occurred between 200 and
400 ms, whereas frontocentral face congruity effects occurred from
200 to 900 ms, as did type effects at these times and sites, and
occipitotemporal sites also showed LPC effects after 400 ms.
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FIGURE 3 | Mental imagery congruity effects for objects. (A) Grand average ERPs between −100 and 900 ms at all 32 channels shown filtered low-pass
30 Hz. (B) Maps of voltage across the scalp for difference waves of the ERPs in (A) within each analysis time period.
N400
Focal spatiotemporal results (Table 2; Figure 4C) at centroparietal
sites showed a category type effect from 400 to 500 ms, congruity
effects from 300 to 500 ms, and congruity by type interactions
from 200 to 500 ms. The N400 for faces was larger over the left
hemisphere, as demonstrated by three-way interactions of type
by congruity by hemisphere that were significant from 300 to
400 ms and marginal before and after [200–300 msF(1, 17)= 3.05,
p= 0.099; 400–500 ms F= 3.89,p= 0.065]. Planned simple effects
tests (Table 2) from 200 to 300 ms showed no N400 effects for faces,
and, instead, N3 congruity effects for objects with inverted polarity
at these sites (i.e.,most negative for congruous) as observed at adja-
cent occipitotemporal sites (Figure 3). Later, from 300 to 400 ms,
congruity affected faces in the predicted direction (i.e., most nega-
tive for incongruous), as N400 congruity was significant for faces.
From 400 to 500 ms, posterior LPC congruity effects began: Con-
gruity was significant for objects and congruity by hemisphere
was marginal for faces, as the effect was larger on the right (F[1,
17]= 4.12, p= 0.058). In sum, centroparietal sites showed occip-
itotemporal polarity inversion of N3 congruity effects for objects,
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FIGURE 4 | Mental imagery congruity effects on the N3 and N400 and
P3. Grand average ERPs between −100 and 400 ms at (A) right frontopolar
(2) and right frontocentral (12) N3 sites and (C) left centroparietal N400 (19)
and parietal P3 (25) sites. Filtered low-pass 30 Hz. VPP, vertex positive
potential. (B) sLORETA sources of congruity difference waves at times of
the N3, N400, and P3. Images plot the magnitude of the estimated current
density based on the standardized electrical activity in each of 6,239 voxels
of 5 mm3 size.
N400 congruity effects for faces, and, after 400 ms, the start of
posterior LPC congruity effects (Figures 2–4).
500–900ms: LPC
As the earlier centroparietal focal results indicated, LPC congruity
effects began around 400 ms. Posterior positivity is greater for
incongruous than congruous pictures (Figures 2, 3, and 5C) and
for objects than faces (Figure 7). Accordingly, omnibus results
P3
Incongruous - Congruous
LPC
A
B
C
P3
Objects
0    300  600 ms
1 µV
400-500         500-600 ms
P3
LPC
Faces
400-500         500-600 ms
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0
FIGURE 5 | Mental imagery congruity effects on the P3 and late
positive complex (LPC). Grand average ERPs between −100 and 700 ms
show congruity effects (A) on a P3 at a midline parietal site (30) and (C) on
a late positive complex (LPC) at a right centroparietal site (20). Filtered
low-pass 30 Hz. Shading captures the 500–700 ms time when the LPC is
maximal. (B) sLORETA sources of congruity difference waves at times of
the P3 and LPC. Images plot the magnitude of the estimated current
density based on the standardized electrical activity in each of 6,239 voxels
of 5 mm3 size.
showed category type and congruity effects from 500 to 900 ms
and congruity by type interactions from 500 to 700 ms (Table 1),
reflecting continuing frontal type effects and frontocentral con-
gruity effects with faces, as reported above for frontal focal results,
and continuing LPC type effects until 900 ms and congruity effects
until 700 ms. Focal results at centroparietal pair 19-20 confirmed
the posterior distribution of the LPC, showing category type
and congruity effects (Table 2); as congruity and type did not
interact, congruity affected both category types. Planned simple
effects tests (Table 2) showed that congruity effects continued
until 700 ms for objects and were in the same direction for faces
(i.e., more positive for incongruous) but did not reach significance
[500–700 ms: congruity by hemisphere, F(1, 17)= 2.28, p= 0.15]
perhaps due to ongoing frontal congruity effects in the opposite
direction that may partly cancel out the posterior LPC effect for
faces.
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FIGURE 6 | Mental imagery category effects on the N3 and N400. Grand
average ERPs between −100 and 400 ms at (A) right frontopolar (2) and
right frontocentral (12) N3 sites and (C) left centroparietal N400 (19) and
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P3 PEAK LATENCY AND AMPLITUDE
Visual inspection revealed prominent parietal P3-like peaks
between 300 and 700 ms, resembling immediate perceptual
repetition priming that makes the P3 earlier and larger (Bentin
and McCarthy, 1994). Likewise, here, the P3 appeared to peak
earlier for congruous than incongruous stimuli, resulting in a
P3 that is more positive for congruous than incongruous ini-
tially and then later shows the opposite (Figures 2, 3, and 5A).
Results of ANOVAs on local positive peak latency data at midline
occipitoparietal site 30 confirmed that the P3 peaked earlier for
congruous (426 ms) than incongruous (496 ms) stimuli [con-
gruity, F(1, 17)= 11.41, p= 0.004], regardless of category. Peak
latency captured the P3 pattern better than mean amplitude due
to overlapping N400 and LPC effects. P3 mean amplitude results
at site 30 showed only that the P3 was more positive for congru-
ous than incongruous faces from 300 to 700 ms and marginally
the opposite (more positive for incongruous than congruous) for
objects from 400 to 500 ms; there were significant effects of con-
gruity (300–400 ms, F= 20.61, p< 0.001) and congruity by type
(300–700 ms: Fs> 13, ps< 0.003) due to congruity being signif-
icant for faces (300–500 ms, Fs> 7.45, ps< 0.015) and marginal
for objects (400–500 ms, F= 3.63, p= 0.074).
MENTAL IMAGERY SOURCES
Because faces and objects recruit distinct occipitotemporal areas
(Hasson et al., 2003), the cortical sources of mental imagery should
differ between these categories. Estimated cortical sources of each
of the four difference waves were consistent with known prefrontal
and posterior face (object) processing areas. MNI coordinates are
reported for the maximum activated region (x y z) and up to four
anatomically distinct sources, the Brodmann’s areas (BA) for all,
and the BA for up to four secondary sources that are contiguous
with the maximum; this captured all clear sources.
Congruity (incongruous–congruous)
For faces, results were consistent with ERP and fMRI evidence for
prefrontal and temporal lobe generators during recognition and
priming of faces (Henson et al., 2003). Specifically, congruity for
faces from 200 to 400 ms during the N3 and N400 (and over-
lapping P3) reflects sources in medial prefrontal cortex, VLPFC,
and superior temporal cortex: Figure 4B shows sources observed,
from 200 to 300 ms, in medial frontal gyrus [BA9 at 5 45 25 and,
from 300 to 400 ms in VLPFC (BA47 at 15 35 −30; BA11)] and
superior temporal gyrus (STG; BA38). After 400 ms, P3 and LPC
congruity reflect sources in prefrontal and middle temporal cor-
tex: Figure 5B shows sources observed in middle temporal gyrus
(400–500 ms BA21 at 70 −35 −5; 500–700 ms BA21 at 70 −35
−10) and, after 500 ms, also in medial and superior frontal gyrus
(not shown; 500–600 ms, BA9/10 at 0 55 25; 600–700 ms, BA9/10
at 5 60 30).
For objects, N3 congruity effects occurred from 200 to 400 ms
and so this time was of primary interest. Results were consistent
with N3 and fMRI evidence for ventral object processing stream
generators during categorization and priming (Henson et al., 2004;
Schendan and Stern, 2008; Schendan and Maher, 2009; Schen-
dan and Lucia, 2010). Specifically, during the N3 (Figure 4B),
sources were observed, from 200 to 300 ms, in middle tempo-
ral gyrus (BA21 at 70 −35 −10) extending to inferior (BA37)
and superior temporal (BA22) and fusiform (BA37) and middle
occipital gyri (BA19) and, from 300 to 400 ms, at the junction
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FIGURE 8 | Mental imagery congruity effects for faces with common average reference. Same as Figure 2A, except ERPs were re-referenced to the
common average and plotted positive up for comparison with some other work.
of posterior fusiform and inferior occipital gyri (BA18 at 25 −90
−25 and 35 −90 −20) extending posteriorly to lingual (BA17)
and anteriorly to fusiform (BA20 at −45 −25 −30; BA 37) and
parahippocampal gyri (BA36). Afterward, during the later P3
peak to incongruous objects and the LPC (Figure 5B), various
ventral stream sources continued, and prefrontal ones occurred
initially from 400 to 500 ms: Sources were observed from (i)
400–500 ms, in VLPFC (BA47 at 20 30 −30), (ii) 400–700 ms, in
fusiform (400–500 ms, BA37 at 55 −55 −25; 500–700 ms, BA20
at 55 −40 −30; BA36 at all times; BA19 at 400–500 ms), (iii)
400–900 ms, in inferior (BA20 and 37; a maximum also from
800–900 ms at BA20 at −60 −55 −20) and middle temporal gyri
(BA20 until 700 ms), (iv) 600–700 ms, in parahippocampal gyrus
(BA36).
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Table 1 | F -values for significant effects in lateral (lat) and midline (mid) omnibus ANOVAs with congruity (C) and category type (T) factors at
each time period.
ERP N3 N3, N400, P3 LPC
Time (ms) 200–300 300–400 400–500 500–700 700–900
Source Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid
Type 14.52** 5.78* 13.03** 8.84** 13.71** 13.26** 20.26** 27.61** 32.67** 32.8**
T×E 23.57** 20.59** 11.91** 11.6** 9.23** 7.78* 7.62** 6.19* 7.5** 8.24*
T×H – 43.05** – 20.17** 28.32** 13.15** 49.96** 5.49* 9.53** 8.04**
T×E×H 2.63* – – – – 6.04* 2.53* 12.56** 2.57* 10.1**
Congruity 12.99** 11.98** 28.72** 26.52** – – – – – 5.94*
C×E 18.29** 24.73** 13.52** 14.7** 3.62* – 9.38** 17.72** – –
C×H – 20.38** – 6.83** – – – 8.84** – –
C×E×H – – – 10.4** – – – – – –
T×C – 11.62** 8.05* 16.65** 23.51** 23.72** 8.18* 14.38** – –
T×C×E 10.16** – 9.66** – 6.05** – 6.89** – – –
T×C×E×H – 15.93** – 19.21** – 7.72** – 10.93** – –
**p<0.01, *p≤0.05, –p>0.05. E, electrode; H, hemisphere for lateral or anterior-posterior site for midline.
Category type (object–face)
As expected for domain-specificity (Downing et al., 2006), objects
and faces differed primarily in object and face-sensitive areas of
the ventral visual pathway (Figure 6B shows only 200–400 ms as
later sources remained similar). Specifically, incongruous stimuli
showed sources (i) continuously until 900 ms in inferior temporal
(maximum 200–300 ms: BA20 at 60 −35 −20; maximum 400–
500 ms: BA37 at 60 −55 −10) and (ii) middle temporal gyri
(maximum 300–400 for BA20 at 60 −45 −20), (iii) in fusiform
gyrus at most times (BA36, 37: 200–500 ms), and (iv) in middle
occipital gyrus from 300 to 500 ms (BA37; BA19). Likewise, con-
gruous stimuli also showed category differences in these regions:
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Table 2 | F -values for significant effects of congruity (C) and category
type (T) at lateral electrode pairs and time periods in focal ANOVAs
(upper) and corresponding planned simple effects tests of congruity
for each category type (lower).
Start time (ms) 200 300 400 500 700
FRONTOPOLAR (PAIR 1–2) FOCAL ANOVA
T 45.13** 15.22** 13.29** 5.80* 5.76*
C 11.80** 16.96** – – –
T×C 5.20* – – – –
Congruity effect for each category
Objects 17.38** 12.28** – – –
Faces – 5.34* – – –
FRONTOCENTRAL (PAIR 11–12) FOCAL ANOVA
T 17.37** 13.84** 10.56** 18.08** 29.59**
C 23.87** 26.35** – 9.80** 7.41*
T×C 5.31* 13.60** 21.49** 12.26** –
Congruity effect for each category
Objects 15.47** 7.94* – – –
Faces 19.96** 31.84** 9.13** 15.25** 9.17**
OCCIPITOTEMPORAL (PAIR 17–18) FOCAL ANOVA
T 9.10** 9.37** 10.79** – –
T×H – – 7.36* 10.13** 4.85*
C – – 4.97* – –
Congruity effect for each category
Objects 5.22* – 7.05* 7.76* –
CENTROPARIETAL (PAIR 19–20) FOCAL ANOVA
T – – – 8.19* 7.33*
T×H – – 23.27** 33.56** 30.06**
C – 10.42** 5.34* 6.32* –
T×C 12.27** 5.91* 9.51** – –
T×C×H – 4.63* – – –
Congruity effect for each category
Objects 9.36** – 23.50** 13.82** –
Faces – 12.30** – – –
**p<0.01. *p≤0.05. –p>0.05. H, hemisphere. Results for 100ms time periods
from 200 to 500ms; results for 200ms time periods after 500ms.
Sources were observed (i) in middle temporal gyrus (200–300 ms
maximum for BA37 at 50−40−15; BA20), (ii) from 200 to 300 ms
in fusiform gyrus (BA36/37), (iii) at most times in inferior tempo-
ral gyrus (BA37 at −60 −65 −10; BA20: 300–500 ms), (iv) from
300 to 400 ms in middle occipital gyrus (BA19/37). In addition,
congruous stimuli showed sources of category differences in (v)
STG from 400 to 500 ms (BA22 at 70−25 5; BA41/42), consistent
with superior temporal face-specific processes (Puce and Perrett,
2003).
PERCEPTION CONTROL ERPs
Results have already been reported for face ERPs before 500 ms
and comparisons of the early VPP/N170 between perception and
mental imagery of faces, demonstrating typical perceptual adap-
tation reduction of the VPP/N170 for repeated faces, as well
as adaptation of later ERPs until 500 ms (Ganis and Schen-
dan, 2008). Here, we focus on results for faces after 500 ms,
results for objects, and comparisons between faces and objects.
For faces (Figure 10), adaptation continued until 900 ms [i.e.,
more negative anteriorly and more positive at occipitotempo-
ral sites for congruous (adapted) than incongruous], as shown
by significant effects of congruity [700–899 ms F(1, 17)= 8.47,
p= 0.01], congruity by electrode [500–699 ms F(12, 204)= 8.91,
p= 0.001; 700–899 ms F= 15.88, p< 0.001], congruity by hemi-
sphere [500–699 ms F(1, 17)= 15.63, p= 0.001; 700–899 ms
F= 11.72, p= 0.003], and congruity by electrode by hemisphere
[700–899 msF(12, 204)= 2.37,p= 0.048]. Objects largely showed
the opposite (Figure 11), resembling instead ERPs during rapid
masked repetition priming that is associated with faster response
times when the prime is more similar, relative to different from,
the target (i.e., a positive priming benefit; Forster and Davis, 1984;
Eddy et al., 2006). Such masked priming is associated with mod-
ulations of the VPP (labeled N190 in such work), frontal N3, and
centroparietal N400, which are more negative for incongruous
than congruous objects; an occipitotemporal N170 (labeled P190)
and occipitotemporal N3 counterpart show the opposite (Eddy
et al., 2006; Eddy and Holcomb,2010). However, the present results
would suggest that such positive priming benefits any category
within the domain of non-face objects (i.e., between different
non-face, basic, object categories) relative to the cross domain
case (i.e., between faces and non-face objects), whereas all ERP
masked object priming studies to date compared identical object
pictures to unrelated non-face objects (Eddy et al., 2006, 2007;
Eddy and Holcomb, 2009, 2010, 2011). To capture this similar-
ity between the present object perception results and the prior
masked object priming findings, the times and sites of masked
priming effects were analyzed (Eddy et al., 2006; Eddy and Hol-
comb, 2010). Results confirmed the similarity of the present results
to those in studies of masked priming: From 100 to 250 ms at
frontocentral pair 11-12 for the VPP (i.e., N190), congruity was
significant [F(1, 17)= 29.34,p< 0.001] and marginal at pair 23-24
for the occipitotemporal N170 (i.e., P190;F= 3.44,p= 0.081), sig-
nificant from 250 to 350 ms for the N3 at frontocentral pair 11-12
(F= 21.84,p< 0.001), and 350–500 ms for the N400 at centropari-
etal pair 19-20 (F= 23.49, p< 0.001), but the centroparietal effect
appeared to reflect only the overlapping LPC, suggesting minimal
N400 modulation if any.
For completeness, the same focal spatiotemporal analyses com-
pared perceptual congruity between types, as done for imagery,
and a 140–180 ms time window was added to assess the VPP/N170,
as had been done previously for faces (Ganis and Schendan,
2008). Results confirmed that perceptual congruity effects differed
between categories during the VPP/N170, frontal N3, centropari-
etal N400, and posterior LPC. Specifically, at all times after 200 ms
[all dfs (1, 17)], frontopolar ERPs showed effects of type (type
at 500–899 ms Fs> 5.72, ps< 0.03; type by hemisphere at 200–
899 msFs> 11,ps< 0.005) and congruity (200–899 ms: congruity
Fs> 43,ps< 0.001; congruity by hemisphereFs> 10,ps< 0.006),
and their interaction (type by congruity by hemisphere at 200–
899 ms Fs> 4.99, ps< 0.04). Frontocentral ERPs showed effects
of type during the VPP and after 500 ms (140–180 and 500–
899 ms Fs> 7.96, ps< 0.02), effects of congruity at all times
(congruity at 140–180 and 200–899 ms Fs> 6.2, ps< 0.03; con-
gruity by hemisphere at 200–299 ms Fs> 4.91, ps< 0.042), and
their interaction during the VPP and N3 (type by congruity by
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FIGURE 10 | Perception congruity effects for faces. Grand average ERPs between −100 and 900 ms at all 32 channels shown filtered low-pass 30 Hz. LPC,
late positive complex. For congruous, pictures of two different people’s faces were presented sequentially, and for incongruous, a picture of a non-face object
preceded a picture of a face.
hemisphere at 140–180 and 200–299 ms Fs> 6.31, ps< 0.01).
Occipitotemporal ERPs showed effects of type on the N170
and LPC (type at 140–180 and 400–499 ms Fs> 4.65, ps< 0.05;
type by hemisphere 200–299 ms Fs> 12, ps< 0.003), and only
the N170 showed effects of congruity (140–180 ms, F = 15.81,
p= 0.001) and the interaction (type by congruity at 140–180 ms,
F = 16.80, p= 0.001). Centroparietal sites showed effects of type
(type by hemisphere at 200–499 ms, Fs> 6.02, ps< 0.03), con-
gruity (400–499 ms Fs> 6.77, ps< 0.002), and interactions of
type by congruity (200–499 ms Fs> 7.21, ps< 0.02), but reflected
N400 adaptation for faces and instead overlapping LPC prim-
ing for objects. After 300 ms, the LPC at posterior pair 25-26
showed effects of type (300–499 ms Fs> 8.31, ps< 0.02) and
the interactions (type by congruity at 500–899 ms, Fs> 4.94,
ps< 0.05; type by congruity by hemisphere at 300–399, Fs> 6.56,
ps< 0.03).
PERFORMANCE
As stimulus timing is critical to interpreting the results, time to
report mental image generation (mental imagery experiment) or
identification (perception experiment) is reported in more detail
than before (Ganis and Schendan, 2008). Results of an ANOVA
with experiment (imagery, perception), congruity, and category
factors demonstrated that timing differences cannot explain cat-
egory and congruity effects. Mental imagery was slower than
perception [F(1, 17)= 267.30, p< 0.001], as subjects took a long
time, 3,889 ms, from the onset of the word cue to report gen-
eration of the mental image, and only 1,070 ms from the onset
of the first picture during perception to report identification of
the face (categorization of the object); note, with the 200 ms ISI
included, these times corresponded to an average, stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) of 4,089 ms for imagery (SD= 792 ms; range
2,548–5,252 ms) and 1,270 ms for perception (SD= 346 ms; range
754–2,113 ms). Critically, these SOA times were indistinguishable
between category and congruity conditions (Fs< 1,ps> 0.8), and,
no interaction was significant (Fs< 2.1, ps> 0.17). Specifically,
for mental imagery, SOAs were similar between categories and
between congruous (faces 4,071 ms; objects 4,107 ms) and incon-
gruous conditions (faces 4,081 ms; objects 4,096 ms). Likewise, for
perception, SOAs were similar between categories and between
congruous (faces 1,311 ms; objects 1,224 ms) and incongruous
conditions (faces 1,247 ms; objects 1,298 ms).
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FIGURE 11 | Perception congruity effects for objects. Grand average ERPs between −100 and 900 ms at all 32 channels shown filtered low-pass 30 Hz. LPC,
late positive complex. For congruous, pictures of two different objects were presented sequentially, and for incongruous, a picture of a face preceded a picture
of an object.
DISCUSSION
The findings reveal the cortical dynamics of ongoing top-down
processes of mental imagery of visual shape during later knowl-
edge, meaning, and decision processing of a perceived picture.
Overall, ongoing mental imagery facilitates categorical percep-
tion during the early VPP/N170, as reported previously (Ganis
and Schendan, 2008), and higher cognitive processes during later
ERPs, as reported here. Specifically, the frontal N3(00) complex,
which indexes object and face cognition, knowledge, and category
decisions from 200 to 400 ms and the centroparietal linguistic
N400 index of semantic memory from 300 to 500 ms are more
negative for incongruous than congruous stimuli. Notably, N3
and N400 effects dissociate from each other not only temporally
(i.e., earlier for N3) and spatially (i.e., more frontal for N3) but
also in how congruity effects differ between categories. N3 effects
are frontopolar for objects and frontocentral for faces and asso-
ciated with different brain sources between categories. While the
N400 congruity effect is small but clear for faces, it is smaller,
and, indeed, minimal and not clearly evident for objects. In addi-
tion, the parietal P3 peaks earlier for congruous (∼400 ms) than
incongruous (∼500 ms) stimuli. After 400 ms, the posterior LPC
shows the opposite congruity effect from the N3 and N400, being
instead more positive for incongruous than congruous stimuli
until 700 ms. This pattern of effects resembles a combination of
ERP effects of semantic congruity (on N3, N400, and LPC) and
immediate repetition priming (on N3, N400, and P3). In con-
trast, perception shows a different pattern of congruity effects,
as predicted due to the bottom-up contributions to perception
but not imagery. Further, the pattern differs between categories:
Faces show adaptation; objects show rapid priming effects in
the opposite direction. Altogether, these findings indicate that
top-down processes of mental imagery can induce a powerful
imagistic mental representation of visual shape that mimics top-
down processes recruited also for picture perception and facilitates
knowledge, meaning, and categorization processes.
MENTAL IMAGERY
Next we consider the evidence that these mental imagery effects are
related to semantic congruity and immediate repetition priming
processes and the implications of this for how mental simulation
can ground cognition in shape processing. First, it is important to
be reminded of key, unique aspects of the present methods (Ganis
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and Schendan, 2008). (a) People had extensive training generat-
ing mental images of each picture of a real person or object, a
standard procedure used in validated mental imagery tasks. (b)
The name (i.e., written word) for the person or object cued sub-
jects to visualize mentally each associated trained picture. (c) A
picture probed ongoing mental imagery of faces and objects, and
ERPs were recorded to this picture, which either was the picture
subjects were cued to visualize mentally or another picture from
the opposite category. Further, two categories (faces and objects)
that are supported by different visual processing areas (Hasson
et al., 2003; Downing et al., 2006; Tsao et al., 2006) were used to
manipulate congruity, and the opposite category was assigned to
the incongruous condition. Consequently, congruity effects reflect
large differences in shape processing. This is because congruent
face imagery (identical face) maximally affects face processes,while
incongruent imagery (object) minimally affects face processes,
and analogously for object imagery. (d) The delay between the
name cue and target picture was relatively long (SOA 4,089 ms,
on average). (e) No task was performed on the target picture to
minimize decision and response related ERPs that can complicate
interpretation of the waveform, thereby defining knowledge and
semantic memory processes as clearly as possible. While a limita-
tion of this study is that the target picture was not followed by a
task that assessed the mental imagery, evidence that subjects did
as instructed is that they took much longer (2,819 ms) to visualize
the named picture in the mental imagery experiment than to iden-
tify the perceived face (object) picture in the perception control
experiment.
Mental imagery produces semantic congruity effects and facilitates
cross modal priming
The most important finding here is that mental imagery produces
ERP effects that resemble N3, N400, and LPC effects observed in
studies of short latency, cross modal priming, semantic congruity,
and semantic priming phenomena. No prior behavioral or ERP
study on these phenomena or mental imagery would have pre-
dicted this finding, as mentioned in the introduction. One reason
is that the timing for mental imagery here is well beyond that for
automatic spreading activation associated with semantic priming,
which is thought to underlie semantic congruity effects and to
reveal semantic memory processes (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011).
Consider that, in the typical semantic priming task, two related
words are presented sequentially with a brief delay (usually under
1 s): A target word (e.g., “doctor”) is preceded by a prime word
that is different and either semantically related (“nurse”) or unre-
lated (“truck”) to the target. Response times are faster to targets
preceded by primes that are semantically related (congruous) than
unrelated (incongruous). Findings with SOAs between prime and
target of under 500 ms reflect automatic spreading activation in
the semantic network, whereas SOAs between 500 and 1000 ms or
so reflect controlled semantic analysis (Rossell et al., 2003; O’Hare
et al., 2008). Thus for the timing in our study (for both imagery
and perception), the results can reflect only controlled seman-
tic processing. In contrast, most semantic priming work studied
automatic spreading activation using short SOAs under 500 ms
and so evidence of behavioral and ERP priming with longer delays
is scarce and more so for the much longer delays here.
A second reason these findings are novel is that the procedure
here of having a word (the name) precede a picture is used in
cross modal priming studies. Critically, for word-picture priming,
behavioral evidence has been mixed and, if such cross modal prim-
ing is found, it occurs mainly with much shorter delays than used
here. Such studies typically use an SOA of about 1 s (Bajo, 1988)
and often much less (Carr et al., 1982) but also often mask the
prime. At such short SOAs, word-picture priming can be compa-
rable (Bajo, 1988) or much less than within modality (e.g., picture
to picture; Carr et al., 1982). At slightly longer SOAs of less than
about 2 s, priming can be absent (Biggs and Marmurek, 1990).
Like behavioral effects, ERP effects of cross modal priming (on
the N3, N400, and P3/LPC) have been found most consistently in
studies using SOAs briefer than 500 ms or unmasked primes com-
posed of multiple words in sentences or noun phrases (Ganis et al.,
1996; Federmeier and Kutas, 2001, 2002; Stanfield and Zwaan,
2001; Zwaan et al., 2002; Hirschfeld et al., 2012). Cross modal
priming from a single word to a picture is more variable but has
been found at SOAs ranging from 120 to 700 ms on the N400
(and perhaps P3/LPC) between 350 and 550 ms when the prime
is unmasked (Auchterlonie et al., 2002; Johnson and Olshausen,
2003, 2005; Dobel et al., 2010; Kiefer et al., 2011) and masked
(Blackford et al., 2012). In contrast, N3 cross modal priming has
been found only in studies that (a) mask the word prime, use
the shortest SOAs (120 ms or less), and overt naming, or (b) use
long SOAs of about 1–2 s and name verification (Johnson and
Olshausen, 2003, 2005). Notably, for priming from a word to a
picture, visually impoverishing the objects (by occlusion or frag-
mentation) yields a more frontopolar distribution of congruity
effects. This scalp distribution is consistent with the frontopolar
N3 in studies of object cognition and priming with non-canonical
views, fragmented real objects, and pseudo objects (Holcomb and
McPherson, 1994; Schendan et al., 1998; McPherson and Hol-
comb, 1999; Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2003, 2007; Schendan and
Lucia, 2009; Schendan and Maher, 2009), which recruit top-down
processes more (Michelon et al., 2003; Ganis et al., 2007), and
as found here for mental imagery of objects. In sum, behavioral
and ERP (N3, N400, P3/LPC) effects of cross modal priming can
occur at shorter SOAs, with multiple words as the prime, and dur-
ing naming tasks, but, crucially, none of these procedures apply to
the mental imagery task used here.
In contrast, for long SOAs well beyond about 1 s and more like
mental imagery here, behavioral cross modal priming from a sin-
gle word to a picture has not been found (Morton, 1979; Warren
and Morton, 1982) or is much smaller than that within modality
(Carr et al., 1982). The ineffectiveness of word primes for picture
targets at long delays, however, can be overcome, by (a) vary-
ing prime modality only between- (i.e., not within-) subjects, (b)
blocking prime modality (Brown et al., 1991), or (c), critically here,
instructing subjects to use mental imagery. A word that is used to
cue mental imagery during a study session primes later perfor-
mance with the picture at a long delay (minutes) on an implicit
memory test with objects (McDermott and Roediger, 1994) or
famous faces (Cabeza et al., 1997) and can do so as well or better
than a perceived picture (Michelon and Koenig, 2002; Michelon
and Zacks, 2003). However, it is important to note that these prim-
ing studies do not use the picture target at test to reveal ongoing
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mental imagery sustained within working memory, as herein, but
rather its long-term consequences for a memory test much later
(i.e., beyond the time limits for working memory). Notably, prior
ERP studies, in which a single word could prime a picture target at
a long delay, have not used blocking or mental imagery procedures,
and, accordingly, no behavioral or ERP priming effects were found.
Although episodic recognition does show effects (Kazmerski and
Friedman, 1997; Spironelli et al., 2011), these do not apply here
because we assess ongoing mental imagery, not the consequences
for later episodic recollection. Further, even if N400 effects are
found at such long lags, they likely reflect morphological (linguis-
tic) representations, not semantic or phonological representations
which do not seem to survive lags beyond SOAs of 300 ms (Feld-
man, 2000; Koester and Schiller, 2008). This would suggest that
N400 effects for mental imagery here reflect linguistic, not seman-
tic, memory representations (Kousta et al., 2011), but future work
needs to assess this.
Mental imagery primes perception like immediate picture repetition
does
Altogether, these direct neurophysiological findings are consistent
with behavioral evidence that mental imagery facilitates object
categorization via priming mechanisms (Peterson and Graham,
1974). Most striking is the finding that the N3, N400, and P3 con-
gruity effects mimic ERP immediate repetition priming, providing
direct neurophysiological evidence that mental imagery can affect
neural processing like actual perception of a picture can. When
the exact same image repeats immediately with no intervening
stimuli, ERPs after 300 ms become earlier and larger for objects
(Nielsen-Bohlman and Knight, 1994; Zhang et al., 1995), faces,
and words (Bentin and McCarthy, 1994; Schendan et al., 1997).
The P3 is more positive and peaks earlier (∼400 ms) and the fol-
lowing N400 is more positive for repeated (akin to congruent)
than unrepeated (akin to incongruent) faces and objects, and a
later P3 or LPC, peaking around 500 ms, is instead more posi-
tive for unrepeated than repeated pictures. These ERP effects of
perceptual immediate repetition priming have been observed at
relatively short SOAs of 1200–3500 ms, which is much longer than
the 500 ms SOA necessary to observe automatic spreading activa-
tion in semantic priming and slightly longer than the about 1 s SOA
for cross modal priming (without special conditions like mental
imagery). For objects, most studies could not or did not assess
frontal ERPs, but one study also shows the frontal N3 is more pos-
itive for repeated than unrepeated items (SOA 2400 ms; Henson
et al., 2004). This study also reported VPP/N170 repetition adap-
tation for objects (i.e., smaller for repeated), but this adaptation
direction is the opposite of the later repetition priming effects in
that study and of the mental imagery effects here, and no other
immediate repetition study found effects before 200 ms (Nielsen-
Bohlman and Knight, 1994; Zhang et al., 1995). Altogether, these
findings indicate that mental imagery mimics the pattern of imme-
diate repetition priming of perceived pictures on the N3, N400, P3,
and LPC. However, mental imagery also enhances the VPP/N170,
unlike immediate repetition priming, which typically has little or
no effect on early ERPs.
The similarity between mental imagery effects and ERP imme-
diate repetition priming is consistent with the role of working
memory in both. Immediate repetition priming is due to working
memory for the first image that is sustained across the brief delay
until the second image appears (Bentin and McCarthy, 1994).
This working memory facilitates categorization of the repeated
percept with minimal or no reactivation of semantic memory,
minimizing the N400. Likewise, the priming effect on the frontal
N3 could indicate that visual knowledge and cognitive decision
processes for objects and faces are also largely bypassed. Immediate
repetition effects on the P3 reflect modality-specific (i.e., visual)
working memory that speeds the category decision (Bentin and
McCarthy, 1994; Nielsen-Bohlman and Knight, 1994; Zhang et al.,
1995). Consistent with maintaining modal visual information in
working memory, P3 facilitation is not associated with semantic
priming, as reviewed above. Further, immediate repetition effects
on the P3 are likely also due to having subjects perform a task
on the pictures, which was often episodic recognition, as such
task requirements maximize P3 and other late posterior positivi-
ties (Dien et al., 2004). Mental imagery had no task requirements
for the target picture, but the practice session required subjects
to assess how well their mental image matched the picture; thus
subjects likely continued to do so incidentally during the men-
tal imagery test, resulting in P3 facilitation despite no overt task.
Thus, mental imagery can simulate the top-down cortical dynam-
ics that are produced by an actual perceived picture, and the
episodic memories encoded during training and practice contain
visual details sufficient to enable mental imagery representations
to operate like an actual perceived picture (as in immediate repeti-
tion priming). This provides strong and direct neurophysiological
support for the pictorial theory of mental imagery and implicates
these strong pictorial representations in episodic memory of per-
sonally experienced, autobiographical information that depends
upon the mediotemporal lobe (Ganis and Schendan, 2011). This
finding also constitutes evidence for the visual detail achievable
by the episodic memory system. Such evidence will be crucial for
developing theories of mental simulation for episodic memory
(Schacter et al., 2008).
Reflexive top-down processes for mental imagery support
automatic mental simulation
By using faces and objects, which have partially non-overlapping
visual processing pathways, these mental imagery findings define
the largest possible set of top-down mechanisms that support
mental simulation of face (object) shape, including non-conscious
automatic simulation. Mental simulation has been proposed to
operate via a pattern completion process that re-enacts modal pro-
cessing that had occurred during learning when later retrieving the
memory (Barsalou, 2009). We proposed that, at the level of brain
mechanisms, the top-down feedback mechanisms that support
automatic simulation are a subset of those that support mental
imagery (Ganis and Schendan, 2011). Specifically, automatic sim-
ulations unfold via reflexive top-down signals from higher to lower
level areas along modal information processing pathways, such as
the ventral stream: Perceiving a stimulus triggers these processes
reflexively (Ganis and Kosslyn, 2007). Through such distributed
multi-regional activity, seeing an object or reading its name (e.g.,
“dog”), for example, re-enacts associated modal features that were
stored during earlier learning experiences (e.g., its shape, color,
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motion, actions with it), thereby constructing cognition, mem-
ory, and meaning. This is consistent with the MUSI account that
proposes top-down feedback processes after 200 ms have the great-
est role in visual cognition, constructing knowledge, meaning,
memory, and decisions (Schendan and Kutas, 2007; Schendan and
Maher, 2009; Schendan and Lucia, 2010). These same processes are
triggered by strategic top-down signals from the prefrontal cortex
during mental imagery (Ganis and Kosslyn, 2007) and so mental
imagery time courses like those here can define when and how
mental simulation grounds cognition. Previously, semantic prim-
ing has revealed the most about automatic mental simulation and
its brain basis, especially with words (e.g., Marinkovic et al., 2003;
Rossell et al., 2003; Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). This is because
automatic spreading activation across a semantic memory net-
work, which explains such priming, is thought to operate via the
same automatic and reflexive, top-down processes that have been
implicated in automatic simulation (e.g., Collins and Loftus, 1975;
Franklin et al., 2007; Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). The similarity
between the results here using a validated mental imagery task
and ERP findings related to semantic congruity and immediate
repetition priming supports this conclusion.
PERCEIVED PICTURE IDENTIFICATION ADAPTS FACES BUT PRIMES
OBJECTS
Overall, perception control results confirm that common top-
down processes underlie similarities between imagery and percep-
tion, while bottom-up processes for perception (but not imagery)
underlie their differences (Ganis and Schendan, 2008). The time
precision of ERPs offers advantages over fMRI and behavior
for characterizing such similarities and differences between per-
ception and imagery. Specifically, perception results dissociate
between categories, consistent with the domain-specificity of
object and face processing (Downing et al., 2006): Perceptual
repetition adapts processing of perceived faces from categorical
perception onward, as predicted, but instead unexpectedly primes
processing of objects during categorical perception, visual knowl-
edge processing, and strategic semantic analysis. Critically, iden-
tification time for the first picture is similar for objects and faces
and so cannot explain differences in congruity effects. In fact, the
timing was chosen to replicate classic face adaptation effects on the
VPP/N170(Jeffreys, 1996) obtained with an 1,100 ms SOA, 800 ms
duration, and 300 ms ISI (i.e., like the 1,070 ms identification RT
and 200 ms ISI here), as was achieved (Ganis and Schendan, 2008).
To understand the perception control findings, it is necessary to
highlight that both prime and target were always different pic-
tures, even in the congruous condition. Thus, perception results
show how perceiving a picture of a face (object) is affected by
having previously identified a perceived picture of a different face
(object), compared to having previously identified the opposite
category picture [i.e., of an object (face)].
For faces, seeing two different people sequentially adapts the
ERPs, thereby producing the opposite congruity effect from that
for mental imagery. For congruous relative to incongruous percep-
tion, the VPP is less positive (and N170 less negative), as reported
previously (Ganis and Schendan, 2008), the N3 and N400 are
more negative, and the LPC is more positive. Altogether this find-
ing and the mental imagery finding indicate that early congruity
effects on the VPP/N170 extend to later ERPs. The direction of
these effects suggests their interpretation. Consider that all these
adaptation effects go in the opposite direction compared to the
facilitation effects found for mental imagery: Adaptation reduces
the VPP/N170 but enhances later ERPs. Such enhancements of
later ERPs are thought to reflect greater (not less) recruitment
of the underlying processes (Schendan and Kutas, 2003). Hence,
early adaptation of categorical perception during the VPP/N170
impedes later cognitive processing (i.e., due to failure of an ear-
lier critical process), thereby recruiting additional top-down pro-
cessing resources to accomplish these later cognitive functions
(Kosslyn et al., 1994; Ganis et al., 2007).
The direction of the object perception findings tells a different
story, which further supports a facilitation interpretation of the
mental imagery findings because the direction of the effect is the
same as for imagery. Specifically, under rapid, immediate serial
presentation, the perception of an object picture primes (facili-
tates) a subset of the ERPs to a target object picture that mental
imagery also primes. For congruous relative to incongruous con-
ditions, the VPP is more positive (and N170 more negative), the
N3 less negative, and LPC less positive, whereas the N400 shows
minimal or no priming. Unlike imagery, though, perceptual rep-
etition shows no P3 modulation, but this is presumably due to
no overt or implied task on the perceived target picture. Surpris-
ingly, therefore, priming of whatever processes are shared among
a set of real objects from different basic categories can facilitate
processing of each other (i.e., congruous perception), in con-
trast to the cross domain case of perceiving a face and then a
non-face object (i.e., incongruous perception). The resemblance
between these perception (and the mental imagery) results and
those for certain kinds of rapid perceptual and semantic prim-
ing supports a facilitation interpretation. After all, the N3, N400,
and LPC effects of object perception congruity resemble a sub-
set of effects for mental imagery and immediate repetition and
semantic priming. Moreover, the waveforms resemble those asso-
ciated with priming under the most rapid, serial presentation of
pictures (SOA< 500 ms) when the prime is either not masked
and semantically related pictures repeat (Holcomb and McPher-
son, 1994; McPherson and Holcomb, 1999; Kiefer et al., 2011) or
masked and identical pictures repeat (Eddy and Holcomb, 2010).
In masked repetition priming, the VPP (labeled N190 in these
studies), N3, and N400 are more negative [and occipitotempo-
ral N170 (labeled P190) and N3 counterpart are more positive]
for unrelated than repeated (identical) pictures of objects (Eddy
et al., 2006; Eddy and Holcomb, 2010). The waveform similarity
between object perception here and masked priming must be due
to the very short 200 ms ISI used here for perception, causing the
ERPs to the prime and target to overlap temporally, as they do
in the masked priming work, which uses short ISIs of 100 ms or
less. The short ISI is probably also responsible for some of the
effects resembling effects for rapid repetition and masked seman-
tic priming (with ISIs of 200 ms or less) more than for longer lag,
immediate repetition priming (with SOAs of 1200–3500 ms). In
turn, the longer SOA here may explain why the later perceptual
congruity effects also resemble some longer lag, immediate rep-
etition priming effects on the N3 and LPC at SOAs of about 1
to 1.5 s, which show the same pattern of congruity effects on the
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N3, N400, and a posterior P3/LPC (Barrett and Rugg, 1990; Hol-
comb and McPherson, 1994; McPherson and Holcomb, 1999; Bach
et al., 2009). Thus, for objects (but not faces) perception-driven
priming and mental imagery congruity effects differ quantitatively
and qualitatively but nonetheless all follow a direction that indi-
cates priming facilitation. The similarity between the perception
and imagery ERP congruity effects with objects further bolsters
the idea that mental imagery mimics perception: Mental imagery
of objects, primes (facilitates) object processing like repeating a
perceived picture.
CAVEATS
Future work will need to investigate why, despite identical tim-
ing, perception of faces and objects produce opposite congruity
(repetition) effects on the ERPs to the probe picture. N170 rapid
adaptation evidence (Nemrodov and Itier, 2012) suggests that
faces are stronger adaptors than some non-face categories. Face
(and car) primes reduce (i.e., adapt) the N170 more than chair
and house primes for all categories of test objects (i.e., faces, cars,
chairs, houses). Prime category and ISIs are the key factors deter-
mining how much, if at all, the prime adapts the test stimulus; after
all, the ISIs of 232–268 ms and test stimulus duration of 200 ms
resemble the present timing, but the faces were of unknown peo-
ple, whereas here they were famous, and the prime was much
briefer (i.e., 200 ms) than here, suggesting neither knowledge nor
prime duration can explain the findings. The reason that the cate-
gory of the prime matters is unclear but generally consistent with
transfer appropriate processing and encoding specificity accounts
of memory (Tulving and Thomson, 1973; Morris et al., 1977).
Other proposals include interference from ongoing late process-
ing of the adaptor due to the short ISI and neural fatigue that
is not category specific but selectively tuned to adaptor proper-
ties (Nemrodov and Itier, 2012). Regardless, faces can adapt more
than other object categories. The present results suggest an addi-
tional twist: Non-face objects can prime better than faces. One
may speculate that, here (and in related work), face perception
shows a substantial adaptation pattern because faces (congruent)
adapt better than other objects (incongruent), while objects prime
better, and object perception shows a substantial priming pattern
because objects (congruent) prime better than faces, while faces
(incongruent) adapt better; both adaptation and priming influ-
ences could affect any result, making congruity effects larger than
either influence alone. The relative strengths of adaptation and
priming explain the pattern observed, which will be important for
future research to tease apart.
This caveat also speaks to an alternative hypothesis to explain
why both perception and mental imagery prime, but perception
also adapts a stimulus: Perception adapts not only face (object)
processing but also adapts visual sensory processing, and the lat-
ter results in reduced sensitivity in lower-level areas, including
occipital cortex (Wilson and Humanski, 1993; Anderson and Wil-
son, 2005; Loffler et al., 2005). This is another way of stating
that both perception and mental imagery can recruit top-down
processes, while perception is also driven by bottom-up processes
(Ganis and Schendan, 2008) but adds the idea that perception also
adapts lower-level occipital areas. After all, both perceptual prim-
ing and adaptation effects on perception are well-documented
(Grill-Spector et al., 2006), and top-down processes from the
frontal lobe, which support mental imagery, have been implicated
in perceptual repetition priming (Schacter et al., 2007). Consider
that different faces share more lower-level features, such as spa-
tial frequency spectra, and so have less interstimulus variance
than different objects (Costen et al., 1996; Thierry et al., 2007;
Ganis et al., 2012). Hence, different faces can mutually adapt
not only face processing but also lower-level feature processing
more than different objects. For example, the N170 face-specificity
effect overlaps spatiotemporally with an N1(00) component (i.e.,
N170 face-specificity modulates the N1), which reflects wide-
spread bottom-up and reflexive feedback processing along the
visual pathways from lower to higher level areas (e.g., Vogel and
Luck, 2000; Bullier, 2001). Adaptation of both the face-specific and
the low-level visual processes results in a large decrease, as both
N170 face and N1 visual components are affected. In contrast,
mental imagery of face-specific processes increases N170 ampli-
tude, but this is a smaller change (than the decrease for adaptation)
because only the N170 face component is affected. This explana-
tion needs to be considered to resolve whether perception and
mental imagery share properties (Freyd and Finke, 1984) or not
(Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1992).
Finally, given the novelty of this mental imagery probe par-
adigm (Ganis and Schendan, 2008), several issues remain to
be resolved. For example, future work will need to evaluate
how individual differences in mental imagery and other abili-
ties (Kozhevnikov et al., 2005) affect mental imagery processes,
as well as how congruity effects differ as a function of the vivid-
ness of the perceived stimulus and subjective vividness of mental
imagery (Herholz et al., 2012). Also, mental imagery will need to be
compared directly with cross modal priming from a word to a pic-
ture and potential processing differences (e.g., depth of semantic
network activation) will need to be addressed.
CONCLUSION
The ERP results described in this report define the neurophysio-
logical characteristics and time course of top-down processes for
mental imagery of the visual shape of faces and objects that can
ground cognition in these modal processes. These findings provide
striking direct neural evidence that top-down feedback processes
of mental imagery sustain an imagistic representation that mim-
ics perception well enough to prime subsequent perception and
cognition like an actual picture. By manipulating congruity by
switching between face and object categories, which involve dif-
ferent modal processes along the ventral visual stream, the ERPs
reveal the largest set of top-down processes for mental imagery
of these shape categories. The subset of these mental imagery
processes that correspond to the reflexive top-down inputs from
higher to lower level areas along the posterior ventral face (object)
processing pathway also constitute the automatic mental simula-
tion processes that can ground cognition of faces (objects). The
ERP congruity effects here therefore provide direct neurophysi-
ological markers for these visual shape mental simulations that
can be used to determine precisely when, how, and how much
these cortical mental simulation mechanisms ground cognition.
Together, the robust frontal N3 and minimal centroparietal N400
mental imagery congruity findings confirm the visual imagistic
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(non-linguistic) nature of shape mental imagery, and further
implicate the N3 as an index of visual knowledge (Schendan and
Maher, 2009) and the N400 as an index of linguistic knowledge.
This is consistent with grounded cognition distinctions between
non-linguistic (“experiential” modal sensorimotor and mental
state information) and linguistic systems (word-related associ-
ations) for semantic memory (Kousta et al., 2011; Paivio and
Sadoski, 2011). Thus, future work on the cortical dynamics of
the contribution of mental simulation of visual shape to seman-
tic memory should focus on the frontal N3. Further, finding both
mid-latency (N3, N400) and LPC congruity effects suggests that,
to ground cognition in modal processing, two types of mental
simulation can operate at two distinct times. Automatic simula-
tions of visual shape (due to reflexive top-down processes) and
linguistic processes operate between 200 and 500 ms during the
N3 and N400, respectively, and effortful simulation (due to strate-
gic top-down processes) operates between 400 and 700 ms during
the LPC. Altogether, these markers, and others defined using the
methods developed here, can be used to characterize and probe
these mental simulation processes in future research on grounded
cognition theory, especially for discovering the neural mechanisms
of how mental simulation works.
In addition, for both imagery and perception, functional dis-
sociations and spatial distribution differences between faces and
objects provide further evidence for domain-specificity and the
modality-specific processing posited for grounded cognition. In
contrast to mental imagery, perception of a face (instead of an
object) adapts categorical perception, which consequently impairs
later processing of a different face, whereas perception of an object
(instead of a face) primes categorical perception, activation of
visual knowledge, and later categorization of a different object. The
differences between mental imagery and perception are consistent
with the strategic top-down processes required to construct and
maintain mental imagery versus the bottom-up input required for
perception, whereas the similarities are consistent with the com-
mon, automatic, top-down, modal processing supporting both,
and further support the imagistic nature of mental imagery.
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